Australia sent the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam [AATTV] [30, later 83 army personnel] to SVN in 1962 to train SVN Government forces. When AATTV withdrew 13 years later it was the longest serving Australian unit in a combat zone.  AATTV won all four Victoria Crosses for gallantry [two posthumously] awarded to Australians during the SVN conflict.

The Australian Government on 10 November 1964 passed the National Service (Conscription) Act to reintroduce national service. Whilst not specifically related to the Vietnam War, the war was a large factor in enlarging the Australian forces: men conscripted for two years were liable to be sent to SVN as well as other locations. The first ballot for National Service was drawn in March 1965, with the first intake beginning recruit training in June.

804,000 Australian males registered for National Service and 63,000 were conscripted.  18,000 National Servicemen served in SVN, 200 were killed, 1,279 were wounded.  At least one source suggested that 'nasho's' posted to units in Vietnam, while initially conscripted later volunteered for active service and many were decorated for bravery [see Last Out, 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion's Second Tour in Vietnam' by Jerry Taylor.]

early troop deployment from Nui Dat [webandofbrothers.tripod.com]

In 1965, the Australian Government dispatched an infantry battalion to SVN, the lead troops of 1RAR landing in Saigon 3 June 1965 and the remainder delivered by the converted aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney to Vung Tau on 8 June 1965. 1RAR, the only infantry battalion deployed to Vietnam manned wholly by regular troops was then deployed to Bien Hoa as part of the US Army 173rd Airborne Brigade.  1RAR was expanded to a battalion group with artillery, armoured personnel carriers, army aviation and logistic support units added. The battalion group was involved in heavy fighting and had 23 killed during its 1-year TOD.  1RAR was to assist 1ATF secure Nui Dat prior to finishing their operational tour.

The RAAF deployed three units: 2Sqn RAAF with Canberra bombers; 9Sqn RAAF with Iroquois helicopters; and 35Sqn RAAF with Caribou aircraft. Additional ground units providing logistical support and for construction and maintenance of airfields were deployed and a number of Australian pilots were attached to US squadrons as FAC.

The RAN deployed warships with the US fleet off the coast of SVN and ran regular maritime resupply and troop transport missions from Australia.  From 1967 until 1971 the RAN also supplied helicopter crews and maintenance personnel [called RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam] to augment the US Army 135th Assault Helicopter Company using Iroquois helicopters to support units from the ARVN.

1st Australian Task Force [1ATF]
In March 1966, the Australian Government announced the deployment of 1ATF, a brigade-type force of about 4500 personnel with two infantry battalions, Special Air Service (SAS) troops and supporting units.  After negotiations with the South Vietnamese and Americans 1ATF was deployed in Phuoc Tuy Province, south-east of Saigon; Phuoc Tuy was away from the Cambodian border and areas in the north where fighting was expected to be heavier, and it was on the coast which would enable the Australians to control their own logistic support by sea and air.  While 1ATF was primarily responsible for securing Phuoc Tuy Province, 1ATF units occasionally operated outside Phuoc Tuy.

1ATF was established at Nui Dat between April and June 1966, suffering its first battle death on 24 May 1966 during operations to secure the area when Private Noack of 5RAR died of wounds: he was also the first 'Nasho' to die on active service. In the same period 1ALSG established the Australian logistics base on the coast at Vung Tau.

In August 1966 the only big battle near the 1ATF base was fought when D Coy 6RAR near Xa Long Tan advanced into a large enemy force moving against Nui Dat.  In heavy fighting and monsoon rain D Coy supported by field artillery held for several hours until a relief force from Nui Dat reached them.  The Australians lost 18 men KIA and 24 WIA but inflicted at least 245 KIA on the NVA and VC force.  The Australian presence in the province was not seriously challenged again, but control of Phuoc Tuy required constant and determined operations by 1ATF both inside the Province and sometimes in neighbouring Provinces, especially in 1968 during the enemy’s Tet and other offensives.  While big battles such as Long Tan and later FSPB Coral/Balmoral in May 1968, Binh Ba in June 1969 and Nui Le in September 1971 made the headlines, for the most part troops of 1ATF extensively patrolled or conducted cordon-and-search operations, and clashes were of a smaller scale as expected in counter-insurgency warfare.

The brunt of operations and casualties was borne by the nine infantry battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment that served on rotation in SVN: 1RAR through to 7RAR doing two tours each, and 8RAR and 9RAR doing one tour.  Some supporting units also served 1-year rotations, while other units were deployed to Vietnam for several years, with the personnel rotated through on deployments of up to one year.

Aussie diggers in the field [webandofbrothers.tripod.com]

Over 59,000 Australians served in SVN, 508 were killed, 3,100 wounded.  Australian troop deployment in theatre peaked at 8,400 personnel.

The Enemy - [plagiarised then edited from the 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion Record 1969-70]

The aim of this article is to explain the enemy confronting W3 Coy [and 1ATF in general] in 1969.  Generally speaking from 1966 1ATF confined its attention to enemy within or in close proximity to Phuoc Tuy Province.  The forces involved were a blend of conventional military groups, guerrillas and political cadres operating from within the confines of the civilian populace. This wide spectrum of enemy types required great flexibility on the part of 1ATF to adjust its tactical doctrines to changing situations.

All armies have a command structure, and to certain levels, a degree of political control over them. The SVN Liberation Army (SVNLA), the generic term for all North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC troops in SVN, was no exception. In accordance with communist doctrines, political control was continued to the lowest levels of the SVNLA military structure.  Command in a communist army implies political and military control.  The enemy's command commenced in Hanoi which issued policies and directives to the SVNLA HQ.  Known as the Central Office for SVN (COSVN), this HQ was located on the SVN border about 100 kilometres North of Saigon.  For ease of command and co-ordination COSVN had divided the land mass of SVN into areas termed military regions.  The region that was of direct concern to 1ATF was known as Military Region T7 (MR T7).  MR T7 controlled and coordinated the military and political activities within its area by the issue of directives to the subordinate VC military area HQ's of Sub Region 4, U-1 Province, Binh Thuan Province and Ba Long Province. In addition it exercised direct command over main force units allotted to it.

Main Force units are those forces that have been designated by COSVN as front line conventional troops.  Near Phuoc Tuy were firstly, 274 (VC) Regiment. The Regiment consisted of a headquarters and three battalions. The battalion's each had a HQ, three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company. In addition the regimental HQ had eight supporting companies involving heavy weapons (82 mm mortars, 12.7 mm heavy machine guns and 75 mm recoilless rifles) and communications, transport, medical and engineer companies.  The regiment had an authorised strength of 1500 men, nearly all of whom were NVA. The battalions were however never much more than 150 strong, a result of the continual pressure against them by allied operations. The regiment rarely conducted offensive operations, but remained dispersed in its jungle hides in an attempt to avoid contact with allied forces.

RPG7 shoulder fired rocket launcher with rockets which were shoved into muzzle before firing [internet]

The only other infantry regiment in MR T7 of similar size and composition to 274 Regiment was 33 NVA Regiment.  This Regiment ventured only once into Phuoc Tuy Province during the summer of 1969 (May-July) and then withdrew to the La Nga and War Zone D Base areas [it returned briefly in September 1971 but after encountering 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) near Courtney Rubber again withdrew north out of the province].

As in all military formations, MR T7 was complete with the VC version of artillery support supplied by 74 (NVA) Artillery (Rocket) Regiment. The Regiment consisted of three battalions and had both mortar and rocket capabilities.  It employed quite sophisticated survey equipment and complex mathematical calculations, particularly in target acquisition for its 107mm and 122mm rockets. The Regiment's 2nd Battalion was responsible for the rocket attacks on the 1ATF Base at Nui Dat in May and June 1969.

soldiers of D445 VC Bn [webandofbrothers.tripod.com/vcphotos.htm ]

There were two engineer sapper battalions known as 067 and 0525, these eventually amalgamated and were called 065. This unit was under strength and confined itself to mining tasks on Route 15 in the West of Phuoc Tuy, operating from a base area North of the Nui Thi Vai Mountains.

A sub-division of MR T7 and one of vital interest to 1ATF was Ba Long Province, the VC combination of Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.  Operating from a predominantly politically staffed Headquarters in South Eastern Long Khanh Province, Ba Long was responsible for the political and military activities of all local force and guerrilla units within its boundaries. To complement its activities, Ba Long maintained two provincial battalions, D445 and D440, both of whom operated almost exclusively in Phuoc Tuy Province.

soldiers of D445 VC Bn [webandofbrothers.tripod.com/vcphotos.htm ]

D445 Battalion could well be considered 'Phuoc Tuy's Own' as it was raised, reinforced and succoured by local inhabitants of the Province. The Battalion in theory had a HQ, three rifle companies and a support company armed with 82mm mortars, 12.7mm heavy machine guns, 75mm and 57mm recoilless rifles and had a total establishment for 500 soldiers. In reality however, it could only raise about 200 men.  Perhaps D445's most notable achievement was its ability to remain out of contact with 1ATF forces.  This came as no surprise as the Battalion had been operating in Phuoc Tuy Province since 1965, had a high proportion of locals in its ranks, and had intimate knowledge of the ground over which it operated.  The Battalion spent a great deal of its time based in the VC Minh Dam Secret Zone, a series of underground base camps in the Long Hai Hills.  When it did venture from this base area on resupply or offensive missions, it was invariably tracked down and sent scuttling back.

D445's sister battalion, D440, was of similar size and composition and relied more on NVA soldiers to fill its ranks. Except for occasional forays against Route 2 villages, this battalion was also content to spend most of its time hiding in jungle base. These two battalions were the main military strength of Ba Long Province and in theory were able to give military and morale backing to VC district organisations and guerrilla units.

VC Ba Long Province was divided into three VC Districts; Chau Duc, Xuyen Moc and Long Dat. Each District was responsible for maintaining political and military control over the civilian population located in their areas of responsibility. To perform these tasks they were staffed with political, financial, supply, proselytizing and civil affairs cadres and a Local Force Company. The real power in the Districts lay in the communist party chapter.  These were committees which in fact were the executive heads of the District Headquarters.  The Local Force Companies termed respectively C41 (Chau Duc), C25 (Long Dat) and C70 (Xuyen Moc) were given tasks in accordance with District Headquarters policies.  Besides these companies the districts had village guerrillas, on the basis of a squad per village, and VC infrastructure (VCI) groups to provide a direct physical link with the civilian people. Often living in the villages, it was through these groups that the VC attempted to gain the support of the people. The VC by establishing underground cells in the villages were able to propagandize the people and gather, by extortion, taxes in the form of finance and food. They also attempted to indoctrinate juveniles into the Communist Party in order to obtain recruits for the Local Force Battalions and Companies.

soldiers of D445 VC Bn [webandofbrothers.tripod.com/vcphotos.htm ]

The enemy troops involved in supply and maintenance were called Rear Service troops. A major source for finance and food supplies was the civilian population. These items collected under District supervision would be passed to Ba Long Province Rear Services either by direct pick up using Provincial forces as carriers and escorts, or by pre-positioning in the jungle edges of the areas in which civilians were allowed access during daylight hours.

To supplement supplies obtained from civilian sources, Ba Long Province had organised groups of Production Cells which were VC farmers who cultivated food in jungle hides. The Binh Chau area in the far East of Phuoc Tuy was one such area where thousands of acres of rice and vegetables were farmed.  Besides supplying its own forces, Ba Long Province also had a commitment to supply food and finances to MR T7 for subsequent distribution to Main Force Units. To accomplish this mission Ba Long Rear Services would deliver supplies to the Main Force Rear Service organisation which was called 84 Rear Service Group (RSG). The Group, under operational control of HQ MR T7, was a complex administrative organisation and combined all the logistic functions that one would normally find in a western army.

Until July 1969, 84 RSG operated from bases on the Northern Border of Phuoc Tuy Province, but after that time, moved deep into bases in War Zone D. The group however maintained forward supply points known as Entry/Exit points through which all types of supplies were received for distribution. It was at these points that Ba Long Rear Services often delivered their supplies.

Naturally there were many commodities not available in SVN, the most prominent being munitions, weapons, communications equipment and to a degree medical supplies. These were imported from North Vietnam via the 'Ho Chi Minh Trail' through Laos and Cambodia. Stores destined for 84 Rear Services Group were picked up from transfer terminals in War Zone D and then delivered to main force units.  In addition to the supply of material, 84 Rear Services Group also operated workshop and hospital facilities.  The May Tao base area was the site of a major hospital called K76A capable of undertaking considerable surgical treatment.  Located near the hospital were workshops capable of producing mines, grenades, clothing and facilities for the repair of weapons.

soldiers of D445 VC Bn [webandofbrothers.tripod.com/vcphotos.htm ]

A postal system was operated by 84 RSG which linked the province and district systems. Known as commo-liaison systems, both personal and official mail was transported by couriers through a network of jungle trails that also doubled as supply routes. It was not difficult to pinpoint these routes and many enemy lost their lives when undertaking one of these hazardous journeys.

Even considering the Asian's inherent capacity to exist under difficult conditions the enemy soldier was subjected to extreme hardships and privations. Hunted and harassed, he had no single base and could neither rest nor properly tend his sick and wounded.  He was kept continually on the move, living where he could in not always hospitable jungle hides.  The bulk of his ranks were filled by North Vietnamese conscripts who were not always accepted by the VC and became disillusioned with the lack of assistance given them in a strange and hostile land.  The NVA soldier had no means of communication with his family and friends as there was no postal system operating out of SVN. Continually short of food and medical supplies it was not surprising that so many rallied to the SVN government under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) programme.

The conditions of the local guerrilla forces were not much better.  The stark realism of Dat Do guerrillas eating bracken roots only 10 kilometres from their home town, and Ngai Giao Production Cell members starving 5 kilometres from their village was typical of the plight these people found themselves in.  Lacking the military sophistication of the NVA, the local forces needed constant and explicit directions. When this was not forthcoming, disintegration within their ranks was rapid. 

example of VC in tunnel system, with SKS rifle [internet]

6 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) was fortunate during its tour in that it was able to observe positive signs of disintegration of the enemy's command and logistic systems. By the Spring of 1970, the enemy was in a desperate situation and, apart from small scale attacks, could do nothing to prevent its gradual starvation and destruction by allied forces.  There were two reasons for the VC persistence under these arduous conditions; fears of retaliation from his fanatical communist leaders, and a natural desire for survival. The enemy was committed to a conflict of arms and had to fight to avoid his own destruction.  Although prevented from conducting conventional warfare, the enemy always had the potential of waging guerrilla warfare. To this end he had many advantages and used them frequently with a good deal of resourcefulness. He proved to be a cruel and elusive enemy who suffered many casualties in the coming conflicts with 6 RAR/NZ.