General
1. The précis
available to the infantry platoon commander that stipulate his duties are numerous and detailed - even a little awe-inspiring.
Needless to say, a lot is expected. While it is correct to say that a platoon commander is responsible for all aspects
of his platoon, both in peacetime and on active service, this is of little help to the new lieutenant. Usually he needs some
specifics - something he can get his teeth into.
2.
These personal experiences relate more to active service but spill over into both areas and situations. When the platoon
and its commander become aware that their commitment to active service is imminent there are some subtle, and not so subtle,
changes in relationships and responsibilities to be aware of.
Active Service as
Opposed to Garrison Duties
3. When it
dawns on all members of the platoon that within a short time they are going to be committed to real operations in which there
is a chance they, or some of them, will probably lose their lives, some changes occur:
a. |
There is a
dedication to training as never before. |
b. |
Live
ammunition is used for most aspects of training. |
c. |
Peacetime
safety rules become only guidelines. You must practise what is actually going to happen. For example during
‘training’ a platoon commander may layout an ambush which involves the firing of a bank of 10 Claymore mines. If
that is the case then he, the platoon commander, must be prepared to fire a bank of 10 at a range that he really
intends to use. That usually causes a fresh look at ambush layouts! |
d. |
The platoon
commander will find that he becomes the focus for almost all decisions - some things his sergeant, corporals or even
men had previously decided for themselves e.g. - Shall we carry four water bottles or six? When shall we take our
anti-malaria tablets? Shall we dig in? Where are we? |
e. |
Orders are
very carefully thought about and listened to. Expect worried questioning about your decisions from the people who
actually have to carry them out, eg, cover scouts to carry weapons at ‘instant’ - that usually takes the humour out
of the lead scout’s day. |
f. |
There are many
such changes - one will be the platoon commander’s sudden real worry about standards of performance during
‘training’ there is a higher degree of tolerance but now one has to begin serious vetting of standards; if Cpl smith
has fallen out of the last two platoon runs - are you going to sack him? Pte Brown’s wife has ‘performed’
inadequately during his absence on exercises; can he be allowed to proceed into a combat zone? By the way, your
performance will also come under close scrutiny from the platoon -individually they are not qualified to comment on
your performance, collectively they are rarely wrong. A slack, short-cutter or ‘ good joker’, a platoon commander
who has been one of the boys, will simply not last the distance on sustained active service. The firmest platoon
commanders who insisted on the highest standards (based on common sense) inevitably were, or are, successful. |
Tactics
4. Drills
versus Tactics. A contact drill is just that. It is automatic, requires almost no thought and is over in seconds
... the next action involving a decision is a tactic and is the platoon commander’s responsibility. The advice here is
threefold:
a. |
Glean as much
information as you can on the impending war theatre - what works, what does not work. |
b. |
Practise and
practise and practise. When everyone is physically worn out, equipment has been rigorously pounded, bruises are
evenly shared and eyelids just want to close - that is the time for a break. Get used to practising with a full
magazine on a weapon and a round in the spout - it is a great motivator. |
c. |
Get to know
your section commanders. Some are better at navigation, or ambushing, or night work; some have more endurance,
some are more tolerant, some are prima donnas - they are yours and your responsibility. |
Navigation
5. While you
are responsible for navigation, use your section commanders, your sergeant and especially your MFC. However the location
statement that is sent in is yours. It is to your grid references that the first artillery round comes winging.
6.
With navigation, the problem is uncertainty. That will always be there. However do not compound an error.
When misplaced, hold a huddled conference, admit your doubts, then do something that will begin to clarify your situation:
a. |
fire a
mission; |
b. |
attempt a
resection; |
c. |
retrace your
data (bearings, paces and last known position); or |
d. |
move to a
known position. |
7.
Be aware your navigation will rapidly improve, as will others. Get to know who veers left, who over/under estimates, and who
is more right than wrong - hope it is you.
Relationship with Your
Sergeant
8. This is
crucial. You are the boss and the sergeant is your best mate. You must be a team. Do not hand over tasks you would rather not
do. Let the sergeant get on with what he does best - and that is to get the platoon into the shape you want it. The
sergeant must work for you - to a plan that you worked on together. However, you must make the decisions and while your
sergeant will help you in working out these decisions the platoon, company commander and the enemy will be affected by what
YOU decide.
9.
Situations will occur when you will decide that a split of the platoon is required and the platoon sergeant will be given
command. You should ensure that:
a. |
this decision
is the best answer to a tactical situation, |
b. |
communication
resources still allow you to control both elements of the platoon, |
c. |
detailed
orders cover the new arrangements, and |
d. |
the platoon
should be reunited as soon as the tactical situation alters. |
Do not split the platoon
the same way each time a similar situation occurs.
10.
Keep out of day-to-day detail in the running of the platoon where it is clearly your sergeant’s responsibility. Let him do his
job within your parameters. Detailed supervision when not necessary is irritating in the least, and undermining at worst.
Ambush/Harbouring
11. These activities
require your direct guidance. A good harbouring technique is smooth and quick - it needs to be because usually the
troops are tired, hungry and anticipating a rest. Stuffing around at this point of the day will not do much for your standing.
Nevertheless ensure you are satisfied tactically, especially from a security point of view.
12.
Ambushing again requires your direct guidance. Section commanders normally set them up on your direction.
View the ground yourself, put yourself in the enemy’s shoes (sandals) and try and imagine the total sequence. The hallmarks of
successful ambushes are:
a. |
original
selection of ground; |
b. |
silence (for
days on end); |
c. |
discipline
(noise, eating, duty changes); |
d. |
triggering
(simple but devastating); and |
e. |
security
(before, during and after). |
The Enemy
13. Remember that the enemy
will normally be more familiar with the terrain than you and your soldiers. This means he will be able to:
a. |
track you, |
b. |
smell you, |
c. |
hear you, and |
d. |
react very
quickly |
14.
However, if you can do the basics well enough you will negate some of these advantages the enemy possesses, namely:
a. |
be very strict
with smoking/eating policy; |
b. |
watch your
security (camouflage, sentries, noise, common sense); and |
c. |
learn his
tactics and use them against him. Superior fire power and equipment will, by itself, not suffice. |
15.
Hearts and minds operations can be a disaster. NZ soldiers are either brilliant or hopeless. It all comes down to a
clear understanding of what you are attempting to achieve and how well you can communicate that to your soldiers. Kiwis have
an exceptional initiative in this area. This should be utilized - with careful supervision.
Under Fire
16. When a contact occurs
and rounds are exchanged the entire platoon will, after contact drills finish, look to the platoon commander for direction.
This is where the hours of practice really help. In almost all cases the training works well. No contact is the same and
therefore each requires its own specific action and will have its own result. Some guidelines are:
a. |
keep soldiers
as flat on the deck as possible, almost all shots fired in contact go high; |
b. |
move only when
necessary to achieve a thought-out result, i.e., covering fire, flanking movement, all round security, etc; |
c. |
you must move
to your signaller - not him to you; |
d. |
your MFC
should position himself within voice (or screaming) range (he may order an anticipatory ranging round but you will
be responsible for it, so be careful about pre-arranged permission); |
e. |
position your
machine guns; and |
f. |
decide whether
to assault, withdraw or wait. |
17.
A contact will subject you and your troops to considerable stress - you MUST, repeat MUST retain control and it is not easy.
Things to watch out for are:
a. |
dangerous
over-reaction, i.e., whooping and yelling, long bursts of ammunition, smoking (believe it or not) and cowboys; |
b. |
abuse of
wounded (or dead) enemy; |
c. |
movement that
is not controlled (a major casualty reason); |
d. |
those not in
contact trying to get into contact and thus not doing their job; and |
e. |
uncontrolled
situation reports over the radio by an over-zealous signaller. Once you and the signaller establish an
understanding he can give sitreps over the air but these MUST, repeat MUST be treated as informal until you verify
them. And you do not verify a contact report until YOU verify it. You will be amazed how enemy KIA turn into
blood trails and these into ...? |
18.
After a contact the men (and you) will want to chatter and get it out of their system. Allow for this. Find a ‘safe’ harbour
and relax - be prepared not to sleep a wink.
19.
Remember that a contact at a particular spot does not mean that spot is compromised. It is definitely unhealthy and should be
treated with caution but successful contacts have occurred in a short time at the same spot. However, your troops will be
extremely jumpy and if some enemy escaped then that grid reference is to be treated with extreme caution.
Dealing with an Enemy
Camp
20. This is a very
difficult area or situation to play successfully. When you are on the fringe of an enemy camp you are also on the fringe of
history. You may be about to subject yourself and your platoon to a potentially casualty ridden affair - not necessarily the
enemy’s. There are disadvantages and advantages in dealing with an enemy camp.
21.
Disadvantages.
a. |
The enemy
knows the layout intimately - this includes bunkers, fire lanes, mines and escape routes. |
b. |
The enemy is
under cover and you are not. |
c. |
The enemy is
security conscious and getting close to the camp, or attempting a reconnaissance, is extremely difficult. |
22.
Advantages.
a. |
You have an
opportunity to inflict major casualties on the enemy. |
b. |
You quite
possibly have the advantage of surprise. If you have not you are in for a bad time. Serious thought should be given
to using all the firepower available before you attempt to close with the base. Your results will be reduced
but so will your casualty figures. |
23.
Should you feel you have found a camp, here are some considerations:
a. |
Pause and
think. Very carefully alert everyone of the situation. |
b. |
Do a time and
space appreciation - if nightfall is not far away (1 or 2 hours) pull back and go into a silent harbour - the
platoon will have little problem staying quiet and alert. |
c. |
Alert your
company commander. He will now have the double job of supporting you and keeping the remainder of the
battalion at bay (especially the CO). |
d. |
Allow your MFC
time to marshal all his resources and begin to think his way through silent registration and a quick fire plan.
The strength of the camp is unknown at this stage. |
e. |
Although all
the good pamphlets recommend plenty of reconnaissance, this is often either impossible or very difficult. Be
prepared to spend a lot of time and patience to gain information you consider essential. |
24.
There is no set plan or way of dealing with a camp. Each situation is unique. However, one way is suggested:
a. |
Very carefully move your platoon into a triangle base towards the estimated centre of the camp. Be prepared to take
a lot of time - moving each man a few metres at a time. |
b. |
Be
prepared for discovery at any time. You should be in position
to open fire with at least one MG at any time. |
c. |
Having got your platoon into a controlled shape then by silent, careful pepper potting gradually move your platoon
towards the enemy - again with men ready to open fire if discovered. |
d. |
Keep this up until you open fire or are discovered. |
e. |
Once the first shot occurs - let loose with all you have got - this is when you will do most damage. Think carefully
about an assault, remember the enemy will have fire lanes and Claymore mines and these will be triggered immediately
- again heads down and flat on deck is the safest position. Retain control. |
f. |
Try and gauge the relevant incoming-outgoing fire. If you are winning try to keep the momentum up by pepper potting
through the position. Although it is common sense: |
|
[1] |
Avoid bunching
- that way an enemy mine or booby trap will cause less damage. |
[2] |
Once booby
traps/mines are detected get your personnel out of the way as soon as possible - allow the assault pioneers and
engineers to join the action - they will really be looking forward to the experience. A platoon caught in an enemy
camp can decimate itself very quickly on mines and similar obstacles. |
[3] |
Do not hang
about, fight through, regroup and pause, reassess the situation, resume total control. |
Night Movement
|
25. Night movement is not normally recommended but it may be necessary because: |
a. |
you may need
to extract a casualty, |
b. |
you may not
have reached an objective that has to be reached, |
c. |
you may have
to vacate an area, |
d. |
you simply may
be ordered to move, or |
e. |
it is the best
tactical answer to the problem. |
26. Therefore
practise the procedure. Do not warn out your platoon in training - wake them at 0200 hours - give your section command a
grid reference, brief the platoon and then move away.
Safety versus
Operational Constraints
27. Not always will your
platoon be able to operate just as you wish and you will have to conform to other constraints which may place a strain on your
accepted method of operations. For example, you may be required to move more quickly than the terrain and/or tactical
situation deems wise. In this situation you need to identify your problem with your company commander. He may have given you
the problem in the first place! Nevertheless you owe it to your platoon to represent their interests. Where you are
stretching your resources to the point of considerable danger you must attempt to resolve both points of view. However, once
on the receiving end of a direct order you must obey but ensure that those who have given the order are aware of the possible
consequences. Your understanding of loyalty, both upwards and downwards, will be severely tested. Other possible areas of
conflict are:
a. |
proximity to
supporting fire; |
b. |
lack of
familiarity with operational equipment and weapons; and |
c. |
being placed
under command of other units whom you consider to be dangerous, or whose SOPs conflict with yours. |
Manning
28. You will never have a
full platoon on operations. The average operating strength of a platoon varies between 18 to 26. You can expect
your soldiers to be:
a. |
on ceremonial duty at
embassies, |
b. |
supplementing rear
protection elements, |
c. |
sick, |
d. |
on leave, |
e. |
detached to civic action, |
f. |
awaiting reinforcements,
or |
g. |
all of the above. |
29.
Ensure your platoon can cover for the important skills with cross training, e.g., lead/cover scouts, gun numbers and
signallers. It also has important implications for 2ICs.
30.
If you anticipate R&R, get as many away as early as you can - few will want to go but all will, you can bet, want to go at
the same time.
31.
Without doubt during the course of, say, a year various members of your platoon will have, and are entitled to, a ‘down
patch’. Be prepared for this and try to get them through it until they recover. If you do not know what the personal
background constitutes for your entire platoon then you are not much of a platoon commander. Section commanders, you will
find, will request an interview. They will be emphatic that Pte “So and So” is not up to scratch and has to go. Normally Pte
“So and So” comes right, the issue is forgotten and the same section commander now wants to sack someone else. Eventually it
is his turn!
32.
Reinforcements or manning changes could cause a turnover of up to 30% in your platoon after a year.
Load Capacity
33. I am convinced we take
the pack mule syndrome too far. Men became perverse and attempt to outdo each other in the amount of ammunition they
could carry. Soldiers could not move far enough, quickly enough. Again, this preponderance of ammunition caused too much
indiscriminate firing, with little result. This is especially illogical when resupply resources were good. When one compared
the enemy’s ability to survive and inflict damage yet move so competently and lightly, then our load carrying responsibility
was not always reflective of the threat.
Base Activities
34. While normally most of
the time would or should be spent on operations, you and your platoon will spend time in base for a number of reasons:
a. |
operations
end, |
b. |
regrouping, or |
c. |
rest and
recreation. |
35.
Your SOPs should reflect a normal pattern of activity, i.e., clean up, re-arm, test weapons then stand down. While taking a
healthy interest in social affairs do not become too involved. Maintain officer/NCO/OR relationships. The temptation to join
in the bunch is quite strong but again, in the long run, will cause you more problems
36.
The mixture of post operation feeling, booze and access to ammunition and weapons is a potentially lethal one and firm control
should be exercised at all times. The CSM will take care of this but he should get your support.
37.
Quickly get your men to the health specialists for skin problems, teeth, etc. Organize a full programme of
informal sporting activities interspersed with time on the rifle range. Do not allow uncontrolled or excessive firing. The
difference between a deadly hit and narrow miss is only a matter of centimetres but drastically affects the platoon’s results.
Attachments
38. You will be on the
receiving end of some weird attachments. In particular:
a. |
gunner parties, |
b. |
engineers and assault
pioneers, |
c. |
trackers and tracker dogs, |
d. |
local guides, |
e. |
observers
and media, |
f. |
padres, |
g. |
liaison officers, and
|
h. |
company HQ. |
39.
You may have requested these attachments but usually they are foisted on you. The golden rule is - by all means use or listen
to their advice but remain yourself, in control. Be patient. Sometimes they can be worth their weight in gold. In the end
trust your own instincts. Keep them out of harms way towards the rear of your platoon. Never, ever, let them “have a turn’ on
sentry, on the gun, on the radio. Make it very clear who they are to respond to and what you want them to do in a contact.
Artillery and mortar fire controllers are good value and usually know their stuff, but others should hit the deck and stay
there. Tracker dogs vary in performance but will never be better than a good lead scout. There are no bad lead scouts
40.
Take your turn with company HQ. Yes, they are noisy. Keep them away from possible contacts. Be patient.
Health
41. The health of your
platoon will be in direct proportion to its morale. Two or three months without a successful contact will cause problems.
A good platoon medic is a godsend and frequently you will only have his advice to decide whether you try and evacuate someone
at 0200 hours!
42.
Pill time should be at the same time every day and is also a good opportunity for you to do the rounds. It is amazing what a
kind and thoughtful word will do for a tired jaded soldier at the end of a day of jungle bashing.
Morale
43. Morale is often better
left alone. A platoon that is run firmly and consistently usually has few morale problems. You can assist by:
a. |
Learning to ‘like’ your
soldiers – this is different from popularity. Soldiers are generally a rough lot but they are all individuals
with their own idiosyncrasies. Get to know them. They will all have their moments, however you will be amazed what,
in the end, they will do for you - and make no mistake, they are doing it for you and the platoon. New Zealanders do
make good soldiers - that is a fact. If they let you down, it will usually be socially, not tactically. |
b. |
Seeking advice - from your
sergeant, your CSM and your company commander. |
c. |
Not worrying about morale
- worry about your and your platoon’s performance. High morale will usually follow quite nicely. |
44.
Be on the lookout for fear. All will possess it – it is a real and tangible force. Most will handle it OK most of the
time. All will have their moments. Symptoms of fear getting the better of a soldier are:
a. |
silent or
moody behaviour, |
| b. |
requests for rear detail jobs
using nefarious excuses, and/or |
| c. |
requests for transfer to what
appear to be safe jobs, i.e., mortars, company HQ, etc. |
In any case careful and
sensitive counselling is required. Observe strict confidentiality. This is no place for terms like wimp or pogo. Try and
identify the problem and there is a time for open “cards on the table” type approaches. Be aware of pressures from home.
Finally seek your company commander’s advice.
Mail
45. Mail is crucial and is a two edged thing.
Usually mail is good for morale - if it is good and comforting. However, often it brings pressure on the soldier from
his dependents and the double strain of operations and troubles at home become too much. Try and recognize the problem as soon
as you can and do something about it. One way or the other do not let it drag on. Talk to your men about what sort of topics
are sensibly kept out of letters home. Emphasize early and often they are on operations because in the end that is their job
and this is their test. It is a sadly learned truth that the majority of your tour’s casualties are not necessarily on
operations. They can lie in
a. |
altered
psychological comfort zones, |
b. |
broken
families and relationships, |
c. |
bitter
attitudes, and |
d. |
the warping of
the respectful attitude between men, their officers and their Army. |
General
46. There are a host of
topics that one could continue to comment on but in an attempt to summarize the difficulties that a platoon commander needs to
think about, here are the major considerations:
a. |
Decision
Making. You become the focus of and responsible for a seemingly never-ending requirement to make
decisions. Some of these are trivial, some appear trivial and quite a few are deadly serious. It never stops -
both in the field, in base, on and off duty. It is extremely tiresome. Character building, they say. |
b. |
Attitude
Changes. Almost all the frustrations of peacetime training are swept away. Soldiers and performance
standards seem to change overnight. When you, in despair, were wondering whether they would ever get it right, you
will hardly recognize the different attitudes and standards. |
c. |
Policy.
Policy no doubt will be subject to many different variations on common themes, each claiming the DS answer, e.g.,
ambushing, harbouring, etc. Read them all - discuss amongst yourselves then settle on your style. Remain flexible
but not ‘easy’. Watch out for short cuts or easy options. |
47.
So, although the difficulties are considerable and no one has all the right answers, the role and function of the platoon
commander on operations will rarely be exceeded as a fulfilling command. Do not forget to enjoy it. |
![Capt Bill Blair, 1971 post Vietnam wearing black rank & lanyard [click for article 'Seen in Black']](images/Capt%20Blair.jpg)